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For observers of technology and democracy, the use of computers to 
administer elections has always been seen as a mixed blessing. 
Computers promise to help achieve two goals that are at the core of a 
well-run election: speed and accuracy. Computers also introduce unseen 
complexity1 that can be challenging to manage. Trading off the values 
of speed and accuracy against the costs of unseen complexity has been 
at the core of election administration for over a century.2 
 
In recent years, attention to this accuracy-complexity tradeoff has 
focused on voting systems, by which we mean the systems, usually 
computerized, that record and tabulate votes. Less attention has been 
paid to the systems that take over after the tabulation has been 
accomplished. Among these are the “election night reporting” (ENR) 
systems that disseminate the tabulated results to the public. In principle, 
there is no reason to exclude these computer systems from the larger 
discussion of the accuracy/complexity tradeoff in elections. 
 
The accuracy/complexity tradeoff of ENR computer systems is just the 
start of an examination of the role of technology in disseminating 
election results to the public. Once election results have reached ENR 
systems—sometimes through the Internet, which raises additional 
concerns—into “the wild,” they are subject to dissemination through 
pathways that include the traditional and social media. What are the 
perils in these pathways? 
 
 
1 The adjective “unseen” is key to the trade-off we describe. The complexity we have 
in mind is unseen in at least two salient ways. First, the inner workings of computer 
systems used in elections are often hidden from direct scrutiny by the public, and 
even the election administrators who purchase and use them. This contributes to the 
second way in which computer-induced complexity in elections is unseen: because 
computer systems in elections function seamlessly in the experience of voters most 
of the time, the degree of complexity in these systems, including the possibility that 
they may fail, may be underappreciated. 
2 We time the beginning of this tradeoff before the introduction of electronic 
computing because the introduction of mechanical means of automation, particularly 
mechanical lever machines, also introduced unseen complexity into what had 
previously been a purely manual process. 
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In this paper, we consider the role technology plays in disseminating 
election results to the public, including the possibility that the larger 
system might serve as a conduit for mis- or disinformation. We classify 
vulnerabilities facing the election-return-reporting system into two 
major categories, static and dynamic. Static vulnerabilities pertain to 
potential weaknesses in the system that arise because of the short-term 
functioning of the system, such as tendencies toward being “hacked” by 
actors with malicious intent. Dynamic vulnerabilities arise out of the 
fact that election returns are released over time, not instantaneously. The 
dynamics of election return reporting, even when they are not 
compromised, leave them open to being used for disinformation 
campaigns that can call the legitimacy of an election into doubt. 
Technical fixes can certainly be applied to the election-return reporting 
system to harden it against malicious attack or protect it against simple 
errors. But technical fixes are not enough. Some vulnerabilities are 
rooted in inherent qualities of election-result reporting. Thus, policy 
responses must be based on social responses, such as public education 
and more nuanced coverage of election results by the media. 
 
II. Cyberattacks on Election Systems: Knox County and Ukraine 
 
Our argument rests on a premise that at the most general level, there are 
two ways in which computer technologies can play a major role in 
undermining what the public learns about the vote count. The first is 
that the computer systems themselves can be overtaken by malicious 
actors. The second is that even correct information can be the fodder for 
disinformation campaigns, made even more potent by the operation of 
social media platforms. 
 
To help illustrate the first role for computer technologies, we highlight 
two important cases where election-result-reporting systems have 
endured cyberattacks. The first, in Knox County, Tennessee in 2018, 
was a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack on the county’s ENR 
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system.3 The second was a more comprehensive attack on the ENR 
system in the 2014 Ukrainian presidential election.4 
 
a. Knox County, Tennessee 
 
Probably the most visible domestic attack against the computer system 
of an American election authority was unleashed against Knox County, 
Tennessee during its May 1, 2018 primary.5 Investigations of the 
incident suggest that an attack was directed to the Election 
Commission’s website as a cover for a much more extensive intrusion 
into the county’s computer systems.6 Nonetheless, the attack on the 
election commission itself reveals the nature of the vulnerabilities that 
local election authorities face, and the capacity of malicious actors to 
potentially manipulate reported election results. 
 
The Knox County event began with a DDOS attack against the county 
election-reporting website a few minutes before the system was due to 
 
3 A DDOS attack is one in which a malicious actor attempts to overwhelm a 
computer server with a huge amount of traffic, thereby preventing legitimate web 
traffic from communicating with the server. 
4 Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ from 
Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-
avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers [https://perma.cc/F643-2U5J]. 
5 Oishimaya Sen Nag, The 10 Biggest Cities in Tennessee, WORLD ATLAS, 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-biggest-cities-in-tennessee.html 
[https://perma.cc/9NVW-CSMV] (Knox County, Tennessee is the home to 
Knoxville, the third-largest city in the state); QuickFacts Knox County, Tennessee, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/knoxcountytennessee 
[https://perma.cc/M9GJ-8TP7] (Knox County itself, with a population of over 
465,000, is Tennessee’s third-largest county); see Brittany Crocker, Mayor Burchett: 
Cyber-security Contractor Will Investigate Election Night Attack, KNOX NEWS (May 
2, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/2018/05/02/knox-
county-officials-investigating-election-night-cyberattack/572236002/ 
[https://perma.cc/79R4-D9V8] (news accounts indicate that the county had “11 
security experts” who worked to resolve the election night problems that are 
described below).  
6 Tyler Whetstone, Knox County Election Night Cyberattack Was Smokescreen for 
Another Attack, KNOX NEWS (May 17, 2018, 4:54 PM), 
https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/local/2018/05/17/knox-county-election-
cyberattack-smokescreen-another-attack/620921002/ [https://perma.cc/64L9-69T5]. 
2020] STEWART III & PETTIGREW 591 
 
 
start reporting the incoming precinct election returns when the polls 
closed at 8:00 p.m.7 The attack, which appeared to emanate from IP 
addresses in approximately 65 countries, made the election board’s 
website unavailable for an hour, as IT workers scrambled to diagnose 
the nature of the problem and to bring the system back up.8 While the 
server was down, it appears that intruders were able to examine the data 
files behind the public facing server, but not to change them.9 
 
In the aftermath of the incident, county officials, along with the outside 
cybersecurity consulting firm that was hired to investigate the attack, 
emphasized that the original data displayed on the publicly facing 
results server—located on electronic storage cards that stored the vote 
counts from the DREs used in the election—was stored in a way that 
established a physical gap between the website and the raw vote 
results.10 In other words, had the results been changed on the web server, 
they could have been restored by reference to these original memory 
cards. 
 
Events in Knox County highlight many themes that come up repeatedly 
in anticipating possible attacks against the election-reporting system. 
They start with the basic architecture of the larger election-result 
reporting system, about which we say more below. They include 
statements from officials that the issue with these attacks was not 
whether election results could be fraudulently manipulated, but public 
confidence in the results in light of reports about the attack. Ultimately, 
because there is no known way to guarantee against all DDOS attacks, 
nor to resist all intrusions into a computer system, the focus for most 
administrators is on “resilience,” that is, guarding irreplaceable assets 
 
7 SWORD & SHIELD ENTERPRISE SECURITY, ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: KNOX-COUNTY-
ELECTION-WEB SITE-5-8-2018, 4 (2018), ), https://media.wate.com/nxs-watetv-
media-us-east1/document_dev/2018/05/11/swordandshield_15260591778 
36_42308769_ver1.0.pdf.  
8 Benjamin Wofford, The Hacking Threat to the Midterms is Huge. And Technology 
Won’t Protect Us, VOX (Oct. 25, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/25/18001684/2018-midterms-hacked-russia-election-
security-voting [https://perma.cc/5QZJ-Z368]. 
9 Id.  
10 SWORD & SHIELD ENTERPRISE SECURITY, supra note 7, at 4. 
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and responding quickly to the attacks that do occur.11 In light of that, it 
is unsurprising that Knox County Deputy Election Administrator Chris 
Davis was quoted as saying in the days after the attack, “[f]rom our 
perspective, everything went according to plan. . . . All the results came 
in on time. We just could not release them out on the web because of 
the cyberattack. Otherwise, everything went smooth [sic].”12 
 
Finally, the incident provides a glimpse into the decision-making that 
goes into deciding how to respond to attacks of these sorts. On the one 
hand, the presence of several security experts on hand at the time of the 
cyber-attack indicates that the county—admittedly a fairly large one—
had directed significant staff resources to the issue of computer security. 
On the other hand, press accounts also noted that the county had recently 
focused its attention on guarding against ransomware attacks, in light of 
a recent high-profile, massive attack against Atlanta, Georgia. (The 
Atlanta attack had shut down many of the city’s mission-critical 
computer systems for days, costing it $17 million to respond to a 
$50,000 ransom demand.13) Considering the alternatives, it appears that 
DDOS attacks against the servers communicating election results to the 





11 James P.G. Sternbenz, et al., Resilience and Survivability in Communication 
Networks: Strategies, Principles, and Survey of Disciplines, 54 COMPUTER 
NETWORKS 1245, 1245 (2010), (resilience can be defined as “the ability of the 
network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of various 
faults and challenges to normal operation”). 
12 Crocker, supra note 5.  
13 The Atlanta ransomware episode has been widely covered. See Benjamin Freed, 
One Year After Atlanta's Ransomware Attack, The City Says It's Transforming Its 
Technology, STATE SCOOP (Mar. 22, 2019), https://statescoop.com/one-year-after-
atlantas-ransomware-attack-the-city-says-its-transforming-its-technology/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YH8-ZSFZ]; see also Theo Douglas, What Can We Learn from 
Atlanta?, GOV’T TECH. (Oct./Nov. 2018), https://www.govtech.com/security/What-
Can-We-Learn-from-Atlanta.html. 
14 CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 
13 (1984). 
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A more troubling real-world case involves Ukraine and its presidential 
election in 2014, when a “three-pronged wave of cyber-attacks aimed at 
wrecking Ukraine’s presidential vote—including an attempt to fake 
computer vote totals—was narrowly defeated by government cyber 
experts. . . .”15 The attacks rolled out from May 22 through May 26. 
They began ahead of the election, when Ukraine’s security service 
discovered that the computer system of the Central Election 
Commission had been infiltrated, that malware had been installed, and 
that key files had been deleted.16 The next day, the hacktivist 
CyberBerkut, which has been identified as a pro-Russia organization, 
credibly took credit for destroying Ukraine’s election computer 
infrastructure.17 The damage was reported as having been repaired 
before the election had begun. Yet, within 40 minutes before election 
results were scheduled to be reported on Sunday, May 25, a virus was 
removed from the election commission computers that would have 
caused the ultra-nationalist Right Sector party leader Dmytro Yarosh to 
be announced the winner with 37% of the vote.18 (Yarosh instead 
actually received less than 1% of the vote.19) In particular, the removed 
virus programmed the election system to display a graphic reporting 
Yarosh’s victory, rather than affecting the vote tabulation directly. That 
same image was broadcast on Russia’s Channel One in a news bulletin, 
despite the fact that it had never appeared on the election commission’s 
website, indicating that the hacker(s) had supplied the image to Channel 
One. 
 
To top everything off, a DDOS attack was directed against the vote-
reporting system in the wee hours of the morning following the election, 
 
15 Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ from 
Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-
avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers [https://perma.cc/F643-2U5J]. 
16 Tim Mauer, Cyber Proxies and the Crisis in Ukraine, in CYBER WAR IN 
PERSPECTIVE: RUSSIAN AGGREGATION AGAINST UKRAINE 81 (Kenneth Geers ed., 
2015).  
17 Benjamin Jensen et al., Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a 
Russian Twist, 42 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 212, 227 (2019). 
18 Clayton, supra note 15.  
19 Id.  
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knocking the system out for two hours.20 Despite the challenges related 
to the “hostile security environment,” the joint Office for Security and 
Cooperation observer group observing the election declared it to be 
“genuine.”21 
 
Something akin to the Ukraine episode is certainly what election 
officials and other election experts consider to be a worst-case scenario 
for election reporting. Of course, the situation would have been worse 
had the malware not been discovered, and false election results had been 
communicated to the Ukrainian public, rather to a Russian audience.  
 
Nonetheless, the episode shows what is possible with a determined, and 
apparently well-resourced, hacker adversary. Imagine such an attack 
being waged against the state election division of a battleground state in 
the upcoming 2020 United States presidential election. And, imagine 
that instead of planting a virus that caused an implausible victor to be 
declared ahead of the vote count, the wrong leading candidate was 
announced holding a large, yet plausible, lead. Even when corrected, 
such an announcement could both undermine public confidence in the 
administration of the election and provide aggressive social media 
purveyors of disinformation with the raw material to rile up credulous 
followers. 
 
The Knox County and Ukrainian cases illustrate the range of challenges 
that face the ENR system. For Knox County, it is not even clear that the 
attack was directed at the elections commission for the purpose of 
disrupting the election; it could have been part of a larger attack to plant 
ransomware in the larger county computer system, or even steal more 
lucrative information about residents and businesses in the county. 
Nonetheless, the attack illustrates at a minimum that local election 
systems are a target, as are all local government systems. For Ukraine, 
the case illustrates that well-resourced malicious actors can wreak havoc 
on a highly visible system. 
 
20 Id. 
21 OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS & HUMAN RIGHTS [ODIHR], UKRAINE, 
EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 25 MAY 2014, at 3 (2014), 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/120549?download=true. 




Two points must be made before moving on. First, in both Knox County 
and Ukraine, the official vote count was not compromised because of 
these attacks. The official tabulation process occurred in parallel with, 
but still separate from, the computer systems that were compromised. 
Election officials could provide a good-faith assurance to the public that 
the correct results were eventually certified. Second, while one can see 
how attacks such as these could undermine confidence in the election, 
there is no evidence that they did. Americans in general have become 
aware of the dangers lurking in the Internet, and Ukrainian citizens are 
certainly aware of the barrage of pro-Russia cyberattacks directed their 
way every day. As far as we know, there has been no scientific research 
into how the public reacts to attacks such as these. It is reasonable to 
suspect that they become more worried about the integrity of the 
election. It is also quite possible that the reassurance of officials, 
especially local officials, works, and that the swift action of local 
government workers in responding to such attacks reassures voters. 
Because answering questions such as these are important intellectual 
and public policy questions, it is incumbent on political science to direct 
its considerable capacity to study public opinion in this direction. 
 
III. How Election Results Are Reported 
 
Knox County and Ukraine provide a glimpse into what types of attacks 
are possible on the computer systems that report election results. Yet, 
news and other reports of these incidents leave out an important piece 
of evidence that would help place these attacks in context, and to assess 
just how similar attacks could be successful. 
 
To gain a full appreciation of where the vulnerabilities lie in the 
reporting of election returns in the United States, it is helpful to sketch 
out with some precision how information about votes cast in polling 
places is communicated to the public. In the grossest of terms, there are 
two major information channels to consider here. The first is the formal 
communication of information about election results from the polling 
place to the authorities who are responsible for certifying election 
outcomes. The second channel is the reporting of election results 
informally via the mass media, which is how most Americans receive 
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information on election night. While the latter information channel is 
more likely to be subject to mis- and disinformation activities, the 
integrity of the former helps to bound the degree to which incorrect 
information is communicated to the public. 
 
a. Reporting election results formally 
 
State laws and regulations govern how information about election 
returns is transmitted from polling places22 to the authorities who are 
responsible for certifying the results of the election. We have not 
conducted a systematic review of state laws and regulations to 
characterize how this occurs across the states. Rather, in this section we 
rely on our professional experience, direct observation, and interviews 
conducted with five state election officials, who were asked to describe 
how their states’ ENR process work, and to reflect on where 
vulnerabilities in their processes might lie. 23  
 
We have constructed a generic, ideal-typical24 ENR system and describe 
it in reference to Figure 1. Along the top are the three physical locations 
where the information moves within and between the polling place, the 
local election authority, and the state election authority. Along the 
bottom is represented the means through which the flow of official 
information is conveyed to the public. 
 
22 For the purposes of this discussion, we treat absentee ballot tabulation precincts as 
polling places, even though the ballots are marked in a location removed from where 
the ballots are tabulated. The important thing is that in absentee ballot precincts, 
scanners (or possibly, hand-counters) tabulate a collection of ballots in a particular 
place. 
23 No claims about randomness or representativeness of these five states are made 
here, other than that they were chosen because they represented a mix of centralized 
and decentralized systems, in-person dominant and mail dominant, and scanner 
dependent vs. DRE dependent. 
24 Sun Ho Kim, Max Weber, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (AUG. 4, 2007), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/weber/.  




The chain of events starts in the polling place, where votes are tabulated 
and initially reported.25 In 2016, 98% of votes were tabulated with a 
computer.26 Virtually all tabulators, whether they be scanners or DREs, 
produce a paper-tape report at the closing of the polls that is posted 
immediately outside the polling place—often near the door of the 
polling place—once it has been attested to by the polling place officials. 
Multiple copies of this report are made, to be included in the packet of 
materials that is physically delivered to the local election authority on 
election night.27  
 
25 Some local election jurisdictions tabulate in-person Election Day ballots centrally, 
rather than in the polling place. The fundamental processes we describe here pertain 
to these situations, too. 
26 Data and Stata do-files necessary to reproduce this statistic are available from the 
author. Total votes cast by local jurisdiction were taken from the United States 
Election Assistance Commission’s Election Administration and Voting Survey 
(EAVS). Voting method use was taken from Verified Voting’s online voting 
technologies. A small amount of missing data from the EAVS was collected from 
state election returns. 
27 Most states require that election materials such as election return records be 
returned to the local election authority immediately upon the close of polls. Election 
officials do not allow official election return records to “sleep over” at the home of 
the local election judges, even when this is allowed before the election. One of the 
authors of this paper has witnessed a local election director dispatch a sheriff’s 
deputy to the home of an election judge to retrieve election returns when the judge, 
claiming fatigue, went home to bed rather than deliver materials as required. 




Tabulators also typically contain electronic memory devices that record 
the vote-total information that was printed out. These memory devices 
are removed from the tabulator and are included with the bundle of 
documents that is delivered to the local election authority for further 
processing.28 
 
Official records of the election returns—including memory cards, 
paper-tape vote reports, and forms accounting for all of the ballot that 
had been delivered to the polling place—are then physically delivered 
to the local election authority. In many jurisdictions, when the materials 
are received at the local-jurisdiction office, the memory cards from the 
tabulator units are inserted into a card reader that is attached to a 
computer that uploads the data and imports it into the election-
management software that manages the accumulation of vote reports 
from the distributed polling places.  
 
From our experience, it is common practice for these central computers 
to be dedicated to the task of receiving election returns from polling 
places and readying them to be transferred to the outward facing ENR 
server. As the memory cards are read and ingested into the vote-
counting software, at regular or irregular intervals, the election returns 
that have been received are transferred to another physical memory 
device. That physical memory device is then taken to a computer where 
data from the device are uploaded and incorporated into the software 
that ultimately manages the dissemination of results to the public. 
 
In some states, the polling places will communicate election returns 
directly with the local authority, by phone or modem, to report election 
 
28 In polling places that have multiple computer tabulators, one of the tabulators will 
often serve as an “accumulator,” which receives the tabulation data from the other 
machines, and then produces a single consolidated vote report for the polling place. 
This is most common when the polling place has DREs, which are commonly 
deployed in multiples in polling places. When an accumulator is used, the various 
machines are networked together in a “daisy chain,” which allows information to 
flow among the machines. This network, while internal to the polling place, and 
possibly involving electronic poll books, is not connected to computer systems 
outside the polling place. 
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returns ahead of the delivery of the official record of election results to 
the election office. If by phone, staff in the local election office write 
down the election returns and hand-enter them into the software that 
reports election returns for immediate dissemination to the public. 
 
At this point, the local office undertakes a short-term process related to 
informing the public of election results in that jurisdiction. This process 
is two-pronged. The first is communicating directly with the public. 
Many large jurisdictions and some small ones handle this 
communication primarily through a Web-based ENR system that can 
contain both traditional human-readable reports and automated data 
feeds that can be directly ingested into media-based election-return-
tracking systems. Most small jurisdictions handle this communication 
by making available printed reports that summarize the returns from that 
jurisdiction. The major news organizations typically assign an employee 
to ensure that information concerning election returns is delivered as 
soon as possible to those organizations. The employee might be a beat 
journalist, a “stringer,” or even the local election official who has been 
contracted to supply the information to the news organization. The 
emphasis on speed is such that sometimes the information fed to news 
organizations through this human-based network scoops the 
information displayed on the Web-based ENR system. 
 
The second reporting process of the local office is communicating with 
the state. As returns come in on election night, the local jurisdictions are 
in communication with the state election office concerning the 
unofficial results they are receiving. This communication can take a 
variety of forms, ranging from phone calls to a networked reporting 
solution that connects all of a state’s local ENR systems to the state 
system. This communication can also take on a variety of levels of 
detail, from comprehensive precinct reports to simple summaries by 
office. 
 
Finally, the election-night information reported from the local 
jurisdictions is reported by the state. States are less heterogeneous in 
how they report than local jurisdictions, but there is still interstate 
variation. At one end are states that maintain sophisticated ENR 
websites that display results by varying degrees of geographic 
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aggregation and graphical sophistication.29 Some of these systems are 
home-grown, but some vendors have entered this arena and provide a 
product that is largely standardized across states.30 At the other end are 
states such as Massachusetts, that do no centralized election-night 
reporting at all. As with local jurisdictions, media organizations often 
hire individuals to cover state election-result reporting. 
 
For the most part, the election-night reporting system just described is 
entirely unofficial. It is conducted both for administrative reasons—to 
give election officials an initial sense about how the election was 
conducted in their domain and whether any special circumstances need 
to be addressed immediately—and because candidates, other election 
officials, and the public demand it. 
 
Calling this the “election-night reporting system” can be a misnomer, 
because some of the information may flow in the days immediately after 
Election Day. In addition, previously-incorrect information might be 
corrected. We return to this point below. 
 
Whether and how election officials should operate a public-facing 
program of election-night reporting is subject to discussion and debate 
among election officials themselves. The main issue is whether election 
officials should maintain Web-based ENR systems that communicate 
returns directly to the public. Election officials often remark that the 
look-and-feel of these systems is “official,” even when statements 
appear on the web sites indicating the results are unofficial and 
preliminary. Some officials believe that this causes credibility problems 
when the numbers inevitably change before final certification. By this 
reasoning, relying solely on media organizations to report preliminary 
results makes it clearer, though not 100% clear, that the results are 
unofficial. Furthermore, not engaging in election-night reporting, 
beyond posting paper reports of vote tallies, removes an administrative 
 
29 See, e.g., November 6, 2018 General Election, GA - ELECTION NIGHT REPORTING, 
https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/91639/Web02-state.221451/ 
[https://perma.cc/ET8R-Q7H9]. 
30 The largest of these vendors is Scytl, a Spanish firm. In the 2018 election, we 
observed 11 states that appeared to be reporting election-night results using the Scytl 
system. 
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expense and reduces potential administrative headaches. Several 
election officials with whom we talked echoed the sentiment of the one 
official who said, “our ENR system is our largest and most vulnerable 
threat surface to cyberattack. I would prefer not to do it at all.” 
 
On the other hand, election officials are increasingly responding to the 
mis- and disinformation environment by redoubling efforts to have all 
queries about election administration come from official sources. This 
has been most visible in recent months in push-back observed by state 
election officials against civic-tech groups that have begun pushing 
email and text notices to voters containing information related to how 
to vote. Election officials claim that this information is often inaccurate 
and misleading to voters, causing administrative headaches to election 
officials and potentially disenfranchising the voters that the civic-tech 
groups are aiming to help. The same principle can be applied to election 
returns, however. If one is concerned about the public receiving 
incorrect information about elections, and is bent on encouraging the 
public to get election information only from official sources, then states 
and localities have no option other than to maintain highly visible Web-
based ENR systems. 
 
To let the “antis” have the final say, the last point has been rebutted by 
some election officials we spoke with, with words to the effect, “if we 
can’t trust the Associated Press to report election results accurately, 
we’re in big trouble.” The media organizations that report election-night 
results place a premium on achieving both accuracy and speed 
simultaneously. The presence of multiple organizations reporting the 
same information increases opportunities to spot errors and spreads 
risks about mistakes or malicious activity leading to inaccurate reports. 
 
b. The canvass 
 
This tour has focused on the election-night reporting process, but there 
is a related process that unfolds at a slower pace. We refer here to the 
canvassing process that leads eventually to certification of results by the 
responsible authorities, at both the local and state level. The canvassing 
process is designed to build on the election-night results, by checking 
that those results were correctly collected and recorded. In addition, 
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disputes are resolved over provisional ballots and outstanding absentee 
ballots during the canvassing process.  
 
The canvass is relevant here for at least two reasons. Most obviously, 
the canvass is the process that produces the official results that are 
ultimately certified and result in the winner taking office. Canvassing 
occurs under a less hectic timeline than election-night reporting, 
although in some cases, it may nonetheless finish up by Friday of 
election week.31 An important difference between the canvass and the 
election-night count, however, is that it often takes place out of the 
direct scrutiny of the public. Thus, as the election-night count is updated 
because of new information uncovered during the canvass, it may not 
be clear why those numbers have changed. It is this quasi-mystery 
through which ballots can be “found” and counts adjusted that can 
provide fodder for conspiracists or those who would sow discord and 
confusion of the legitimacy of the count. 
 
Virginia is one state—perhaps the only state—that tries to counter the 
problem of the “post-election-night-mystery” by making it as 
transparent as possible.32 Since the state election of 2005, the Virginia 
board of elections has posted a “change log” file that accounts for every 
change to the publicly reported vote totals after election night, for every 
election in the state.33 We will revisit this innovation in our conclusion. 
 
The process we have just described is highly stylized, and would need 
to be adapted to local circumstances in order to describe any given state 
accurately. Part of the process we have elided in this discussion has been 
the counting of mail ballots. For purposes of discussing Figure 1, we 
can treat the place where mail ballots are counted as just another 




31 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 26-7-136 (2017).  
32 See Edward Foley & Charles Stewart III, Explaining the Blue Shift in Election 
Canvassing, 22 (MIT Political Science Dep’t, Research Paper No. 2015-21), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2653456.  
33 Results/Reports, VA. BD. ELECTIONS, 
https://www.elections.virginia.gov/resultsreports/ [https://perma.cc/AXA5-ZFTT]. 
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c. Mail-ballot election results 
 
Two features of mail-ballot election returns bear mentioning. First, in 
some states mail ballots are counted outside the view of the public. In at 
least a few states, localities are allowed to open and process mail ballots 
before the polls close, and even sometimes scan and tabulate them. 
When the tabulation occurs before the polls close, the process must 
proceed under strict secrecy. Part of that secrecy, by its nature, excludes 
public observers. Second, the pre-processing of mail ballots allows local 
jurisdictions that do it to begin announcing partial election returns the 
instant the polls close. (The same can be said when votes from early 
voting centers can also be tabulated ahead of the close of polls on 
Election Day.)  
 
To the degree that absentee and early in-person voters may have 
different voting patterns than Election-Day voters, this can set up a 
situation in which the earliest vote tallies released to the public can bear 
little resemblance to the final vote totals announced by a local 
jurisdiction, either on election night or in the certified totals. Indeed, in 
the 2016 presidential elections, Democratic-identifying voters were 
slightly more likely to vote by mail than Republican-identifying 
voters.34 Naïve observers in states that allow absentee ballots to be 
counted before the polls close may be in for a big surprise as they follow 
election-night returns.  
 
In addition, the immediate release of mail and in-person early votes can 
cause inaccuracies in communicating just how many votes remain to be 
counted. News accounts of election-night returns regularly include a 
statistic to track “percent of precincts reporting.” However, there is no 
commonly agreed-upon method for calculating this statistic; it is often 
based on nothing more than counting up the number of precincts from 
which votes have been released—even if all the ballots associated with 
the precinct have not be counted—and dividing by the number of 
precincts in a jurisdiction.  
 
Many counties that release initial reports of tabulated mail and in-person 
 
34 Foley & Stewart, supra note 32, at 15. 
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early votes as soon as polls close, and do not allocate those votes back 
to the precincts where voters reside, resulting in a confusing eventuality 
of perhaps hundreds of thousands of votes having been reported but with 
0% of precincts reporting. Alternatively, some counties do allocate 
those early votes back to the local precincts, creating the potential for it 
to appear that 100% of precincts have reported, even though each 
precinct has reported only a partial count of votes.35 
 
d. The press reports election results  
 
In the previous section, we reviewed the flow of information about 
election results from the polling place to the state elections department, 
with the intermediate stop in the local election jurisdiction. At every 
stage of the process, there is an opportunity for the public to observe the 
data being reported, and to take part in disseminating it. While there are 
political junkies who hang out at county courthouses and local polling 
places on election night to be the first to see the election returns roll in, 
for the most part, “the public” is actually “the media.” Therefore, it is 
valuable to consider the role of the media in reporting election results, 
on election night and the days beyond. 
 
National and local media organizations deploy a highly decentralized 
information-gathering and dissemination system whenever a federal 
election is held.36 Because our empirical interest lies mostly with federal 
and top state offices, we focus here on the systems that are deployed for 
biennial federal elections. We further focus on national systems, leaving 
aside state-specific networks that might be developed to gather and 
disseminate information about state and local election returns. 
 
Between 2003 and 2016, all the major news networks (Associated Press, 
ABC, CNN, CBS, Fox News, and NBC) joined forces under the 
 
35 We return to this point in our conclusions and recommendations. There is no 
obvious best way to report an estimate of the number of votes waiting to be counted; 
any plausible way can be misunderstood or misrepresented. 
36 Of course, analogous systems are deployed for smaller-scale state and local 
elections. 
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umbrella of the National Election Pool.37 Under this arrangement, 
Edison Research conducted exit polls and helped provide information 
necessary to “call” particular races; the Associated Press aggregated 
data about vote tabulations.38 This consortium broke up in 2017, 
yielding two separate coalitions of media players. These are organized 
around Edison, which added vote-tabulation to its portfolio, and the 
Associated Press, which formed the nucleus of the second major 
coalition.39 Edison provides the vote tabulation data for the National 
Election Poll, which in 2018 included NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN. In 
2018, the Associated Press led group included Fox News, New York 
Times, Politico, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. Despite this 
schism, these new coalitions operate in a manner similar to the old 
regime, so for this discussion we will use language that is compatible 
with the media landscape in 2016. 
 
The purpose of these national data-gathering systems is to assist news 
organizations covering the unfolding election on election night and 
beyond. To that end, the National Election Pool was responsible for 
feeding three major streams of data to the reporting organizations: exit 
polls, election returns, and supporting data, such as past vote returns, 
demographic information, and election laws.40 It was (and remains) the 
job of the various news network “decision desks” to take these data 
streams and process them into information that was useful for covering 
the returns. The most visible activity, and the one most relevant to this 
paper, is “calling” a race in favor of a candidate, in light of the 
information received. But the data are also used for other important 
 
37 Michael Mokrzycki, National Election Pool (NEP), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SURVEY 
RESEARCH METHODS (Paul J. Lavrakas ed., 2008). 
38 Election Polling, EDISON RES., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161110154555/http://www.edisonresearch.com/electi
on-polling/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2020). Edison began exit polling in 1996. The year 
2002 represented the creation of the NEP, which combined Edison’s exit polling 
operation and the AP’s vote-tabulation collection efforts. 
39 Steven Shepard, Is this the Beginning of the End of the Exit Poll?, POLITICO (Dec. 
9, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/09/exit-polls-election-day-
frustration-287913 [https://perma.cc/VC9U-ZMLV].  
40 Election Polling, EDISON RES., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161110154555/http://www.edisonresearch.com/electi
on-polling/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2020).  
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purposes, including reporting about demographic, geographic, and other 
trends that help interpret election results and round out the broader 
election story. 
 
The exit poll information comes from surveys conducted in hundreds of 
precincts from around the country. In a presidential election year, 
precincts may be chosen from every state, although economic 
constraints have sometimes limited geographic coverage in recent years 
to a subset of more electorally competitive states. In addition, because 
more ballots have been cast before Election Day, by mail and in early-
voting sites, the exit poll now has a component that samples early voters 
from administrative data. In 2018, the exit poll sampled approximately 
700 precincts, garnering 80,000 interviews from 32 states. 
 
National exit poll results are embargoed from public view until 5:00 
p.m. Eastern Time, and are never used to “characterize” a particular race 
before the polls close in that state.41 Although data from the exit polls 
can be used to help call the outcome of an election, its primary utility is 
to help understand turnout dynamics and to explore the policy and issue 
attitudes of voters. The media members of NEP were also provided with 
election returns in real time on election night.42 This information was 
primarily at the local jurisdiction level—county or municipality, 
depending on state—but sometimes at the precinct level, when 
available. 
 
The election return information on election night is received by the news 
organizations soon after the polls close. Figures 2 – 4 help to illustrate 
the recent pattern in Wisconsin. 
 
41 Peter Marks & Bill Carter, The 2000 Elections: The Network Predictions; Media 
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Looking at the top half of each figure, there are clear patterns in how 
often updates are received and how quickly the votes are counted, even 
across election cycles. The polls in Wisconsin close at 9:00 p.m. Eastern 
Time.43 The first report of votes is usually received between 9:15 p.m. 
and 9:30 p.m. Wisconsin typically finishes counting by around 3:00 a.m. 
Wednesday morning. The two lines, one showing the cumulative 
proportion of votes (using the final, certified vote count as the 
denominator) and the other the cumulative proportion of reported 
precincts suggests that the mix of precincts reporting throughout the 
night tends to mirror the distribution of precinct sizes in the state. In 
other words, “small” precincts do not report at one time of the evening 
and “large” precincts at another. 
 
The bottom half of the graphs shows the margin between the Democrats’ 
and Republicans’ vote percentages at each point in the night. The solid, 
horizontal dark blue line shows the final, certified vote margin. Once 
again, there are stable patterns in the vote margin across elections, even 
though the overall level—high, indicating the Democrat is doing well, 
or low, indicating the Republican has the advantage—may change. In 
the first hour or so, the vote percentages tend to be volatile, because the 
number of votes reported is so small. The volatility tends to dissipate 
when around fifty to sixty percent of the eventual election-night vote 
has been counted, which typically occurs in Wisconsin between 10:30 
p.m. and 11:30 p.m Eastern Time.  
 
There is also a pattern to their stabilization, in that once the volatility 
has resolved, the series stabilizes around a percentage point or two of 
the final certified total, in favor of the Republican candidate. The reason 
for this pro-Republican tilt in the vote, compared to the final certified 
total, is that Democrat-heavy Milwaukee County tends to report its 
mail-in absentee ballot numbers much later than the results in most of 




43 All times are Eastern Time, regardless of the time zone from which the returns 
originate, because that is the time stamp on the data server. 
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The 2018 graph (Figure 4) also illustrates how election-night report is 
imperfect and can be subject to human error. Around 2:00 a.m., the data 
series spikes dramatically toward the Republican candidate, before 
being corrected a minute later. The reason for this is that new data was 
received from Milwaukee County, but the Democrats’ and Republicans’ 
vote counts were assigned to the other party’s candidate. This error was 
quickly caught by the quality control procedures that Edison and the 
networks have in place, and was corrected. Errors in human entry of 
vote counts tend to be easier to catch when they are large and obvious. 
A massive shift in the vote percentage toward the Republican candidate 
in a heavily Democratic county is easily diagnosed to be a data entry 
error. Such errors are more difficult to diagnose in politically divided 
counties, where the vote percentages are closer to 50/50. In those cases, 
it may take longer to correct such an error, since additional steps must 
be taken to confirm that it is, in fact, an error. 
 
Figures 5 – 7 help to illustrate both the commonalities and differences 
between states. One commonality is how quickly the initial vote returns 
are reported. In Florida, half the eventual votes that are counted are 
reported within the first hour after the polls close at 7:00 p.m. (Florida 
has two time zones. The closing of the central-time-zone precincts at 
8:00 p.m. Eastern causes the discontinuity of the votes-counted part of 
the graph at that time). On the other hand, the cumulative proportion of 
votes counted rises much more rapidly than the proportion of precincts 



























This pattern highlights the way in which Florida reports its early in-
person votes very quickly after its polls have closed, despite no Election 
Day votes having been counted. In 2016, there had already been 223,562 
votes counted statewide before any county had reported even a single 
precinct of Election Day vote count data. The data show that because 
Democrats in Florida were more likely to vote early than Republicans, 
these initial vote reports were skewed toward Hillary Clinton, despite 
the fact that she lost the state.  
 
The 2018 graph (Figure 7b) illustrates a different type of data error that 
can occur. In one county, a transcription error caused the votes of one 
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candidate to be reported as 320,000, rather than 230,000. This error was 
not as dramatic as the one we saw above in Wisconsin, but it was still 
significant, and took longer to be corrected. From the perspective of 
public confidence in elections, errors like this are extremely 
problematic, since correcting them requires changing the vote for one 
candidate but not the other.  
 
Errors like this are also difficult to diagnose and correct because they 
can occur anywhere in the vote-reporting chain. The error could have 
been made on the Secretary of State’s website. It could have occurred 
because the reporter taking the election return from the local election 
official over the phone transposed two digits, or the worker at the central 
reporting office transposed digits. Correcting an error such as this often 
requires figuring out where in the chain of communication the error has 
occurred, which can take more time to complete than simply identifying 
that the Republican and Democratic vote totals were swapped in a 
county in which one party is historically dominant. 
 
IV. Counting Votes in Overtime, and the Growing Blue Shift 
 
The process just discussed is most visible on election night, as the 
national media cover the onrush of election results pouring forth from 
the states. The counting and reporting of election results do not stop on 
election night, however. This is most noticeable when the network 
decision desks declare a race “too close to call” even as the Wednesday 
following Election Day dawns, such as in Florida in the 2000 
presidential race or in Arizona’s 2018 United States Senate election.44 
Yet even when the election night results allow the networks to 
comfortably declare a likely winner within minutes of the polls closing, 
the counting of ballots continues, as does the verification that any 
 
44 See, e.g., Dartunorro Clark & Doha Madani, Democrat Kyrsten Sinema wins 
Arizona Senate race after nail-biter against Martha McSally, NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/democrat-kyrsten-sinema-
wins-arizona-senate-race-after-nail-biter-n935206 [needs permalink]. 
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original counts were correct. This is the canvassing process that 
eventually leads to the certification of the election.45 
 
Edison and the Associated Press initially track the changing vote totals 
actively, as legal ballots that had been in hand but not counted on 
Election Day are incorporated in the count, as newly arriving mail 
ballots are counted (in states that allow ballots postmarked on Election 
Day to still be counted if they arrive by a certain deadline), and as 
provisional ballots are accepted and counted. However, unless a 
particular race has elicited national interest because of its closeness or 
because the national networks have not declared a presumptive winner, 
the public tends to assume that the vote counting has ceased. Of course, 
for the most part, it has not. Each level of government that has 
responsibility for overseeing election-result reporting is given a 
deadline to accomplish its work.46 Those deadlines for local election 
jurisdictions range from the virtually instantaneous, as in New 
Hampshire,47 to one month after Election Day, as in California.48 These 
local certification deadlines introduce the possibility that information 
about election returns will dribble out over time, and that the quality of 
the data that dribble out may not be constant throughout the vote-
certification period. 
 
This leads to an important empirical fact. For the past two decades, in 
most states, votes counted and reported in the days following the 
election have tended to skew more heavily toward the Democratic Party 
than votes reported on Election Day. This phenomenon has been termed 
 
45 Of course, in rare cases, certification leads to contests and recounts. The principles 
we are about to discuss apply in those cases, although the numbers are typically very 
small. 
46 The National Association of Secretaries of State publishes a website that details 
the canvassing deadlines for every state. See State Election Canvassing Timeframes 
and Recount Thresholds, NAT’L ASS’N SECRETARIES ST. (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.nass.org/resources/2018-election-information/Canvassing-Timeframes-
and-Recount-Thresholds [https://perma.cc4Q67-RSEB]. 
47 Although localities typically transmit their results to the state by Friday following 
Election Day, state law gives them until the following Monday. See N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 659:75, 659:81, 659:84 (2019). 
48 Cal. Elec. Code §§ 15301, 15374, 15500, 15503, 15504 (West 2019). 
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the “big blue shift” by Edward Foley, who first identified it in print in a 
2013 article.49 
 
To illustrate the phenomenon, we need two measures. The first is the 
size of the “overtime vote,” which is defined as the number of votes 
counted after Election Day. The size of the overtime vote is calculated 
by subtracting the number of votes reported in the presidential election 
in the Thursday edition of the New York Times immediately after 
Election Day, from the number of votes recorded in the final certified 
results of the election.50 The size of the overtime vote is expressed as a 
percentage of the initial vote. For instance, if the New York Times 
reports results from a total of 1 million votes in a state on the Thursday 
after Election Day and then the state certifies results with a total of 1.5 
million votes, the size of the overtime vote is 50%. 
 
The second measure is the “partisan shift,” which is defined as the 
percentage of the two-party vote received by the Democratic 
presidential candidate in the final certified count minus the percentage 
of the two-party vote received in the initial Thursday count as reported 
by the New York Times. For instance, if a state reports a certified vote 
of 58% for the Democratic candidate but the two-party vote for the 
Democratic candidate had been reported as 56% on the Thursday after 
Election Day, the size of the partisan shift is -2 percentage points. The 
partisan shift measure is constructed such that positive values indicate 
the Democratic candidate received a larger percentage of the two-party 
vote than the Republican candidate, and vice versa. Because positive 
values of the partisan shift are associated with Democratic gains, we 
sometimes refer to this as the “blue shift,” although some states do 
exhibit a “red shift.” 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the blue shift from the past two presidential 
elections. Because the two measures are heavily skewed, we have 
plotted values of the overtime vote and blue shift on proportional scales 
 
49 Edward B. Foley, A Big Blue Shift: Measuring an Asymmetrically Increasing 
Margin of Litigation, 27 J.L. & POL. 501, 520 (2013). 
50 The decision was made to use Thursday after Election Day as the baseline instead 
of Wednesday in order to account for publication deadlines of the New York Times, 
especially in the years before the advent of the Internet. 
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to aid in legibility. To use 2012 to illustrate how to read the two graphs, 
focus on Washington state, which is at the extreme “northeast” portion 
of the graph. Washington’s final certified vote count in 2012 accounted 
for 3,046,066 two-party votes; the initial vote reported by the New York 
Times accounted for 1,885,172 two-party votes. The size of the overtime 
vote is (3,046,066 – 1,885,172)/1,885,172 = 62%, which is the x-axis 
value for Washington. Washington’s certified vote gave the Democratic 
nominee, Barack Obama, 57.6% of the vote two-party vote; the initially-
reported two-party vote share for Obama was 56.4%. The size of the 
partisan shift (or blue shift) is 57.6% - 56.4% = 1.2 points, which is the 
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As the two graphs in Figure 8 illustrate, it is generally the case that as 
the size of the overtime vote grows in a state, so does the size of the 
partisan shift. The proportional scales obscure a second important 
pattern, which is that for most states, the size of the overtime vote and 
the magnitude of the partisan shift are relatively small. In 2016, for 
instance, the median value of the overtime vote was 1.1%; the median 
size of the blue shift was 0.056 percentage points. 
 
The article by Foley and the working paper by Foley and Stewart 
provide more detailed analysis about the history and causes of the 
growth in the overtime vote and the accompanying blue shift.51 From 
the perspective of this article, the important thing to note is that the size 
of the overtime vote has grown since 2004, and the value of the blue 
shift has clearly favored Democrats since 2008, after a five-decade 
period in which the partisan shift balanced out between the two major 
parties, so that the average nationwide value of the partisan shift 
measure had hovered around zero. 
 
With the size of the overtime vote growing, opportunities grow for there 
to be controversy over the vote count, especially in races where the 
initial vote was close and the partisan tilt of the overtime vote was 
substantial. A good example in recent years was the 2018 United States 
Senate race in Arizona. At 6:00 a.m Eastern Time, the morning after 
Election Day, the Republican nominee, Martha McSally, held a 0.87-
point lead in the two-party vote over the Democratic nominee, Kyrsten 
Sinema.52 However, the initial count only accounted for 72% of all the 
ballots cast. The overtime ballots remaining ended up favoring Sinema 
by 11 points. In the end, Sinema defeated McSally, with 51.2% of the 
two-party vote. 
 
During the period between Election Day and the release of the final 
count, President Trump tweeted, “Just out — in Arizona, 
SIGNATURES DON’T MATCH. Electoral corruption - Call for a new 
 
51 See Foley, supra note 49; Foley & Stewart, supra note 32. 
52 These numbers come from the Election Day vote tabulation calculated by Edison 
Research on behalf of the National Election Pool (NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN). 
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Election? We must protect our Democracy!”53 The claim about 
signatures not matching was probably in reference to a lawsuit filed by 
the Arizona Republican Party over the varying “cure periods” across 
Arizona’s counties for mail ballots (the largest county in the state, 
Maricopa, allowed five days to cure signature problems with mail 
ballots. Many of the smaller, rural counties required signature-match 
problems to be resolved by Election Day). Democrats and Republicans 
reached an agreement to extend the cure period in the smaller (and more 
Republican) counties, so the lawsuit was dropped. However, the fact 
that the results of the election hinged on the counting of absentee ballots, 
that the absentee ballots were heavily favoring the Democratic 
candidate, and that Democratic and Republican parts of the state 
followed different rules about curing signature non-matches gave an 
opportunity to President Trump to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 
election, and to suggest that the election be done over. 
 
In the Arizona case, the Republican candidate herself failed to take the 
bait, post-election lawsuits were settled through negotiation, and in the 
end the results were not challenged by the loser. The mainstream 
Arizona media covered the ongoing counting in a businesslike manner. 
The Arizona Secretary of State adopted a media strategy that 
highlighted the regularity of the absentee-ballot-counting process and 
communicated updates to the vote count on a strict schedule that was 
announced ahead of time. Thus, the overtime vote count in Arizona was 
a success story overall. However, one can imagine another candidate not 
playing the overtime period so coolly, using social media to stoke 
doubts about the fairness of the process and whipping their followers 
into a frenzy. 
 
The overtime vote continues the dynamic unfolding of election results 
witnessed on election night, but on a different time scale. Two things 
make the overtime vote different from the election night returns in ways 
that influence the vulnerabilities of the system that reports election 
results to the public. First, the election night narrative is generally easier 
 
53 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 9, 2018, 3:33 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1060993836984324096?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/SFS4-3UM3]. 
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to tell in terms of regular administrative practice. Polls close, votes are 
counted right away, and those votes are reported to the public. In 
contrast, when ballots have yet to be counted in the days following the 
election, questions arise about why the ballots were not counted on 
Election Day, and why/how they were “found.” Stories about the cure 
periods of provisional ballots and disputed mail ballots are not as 
straightforward as the election night stories about the returns coming in. 
 
Second, although there are temporal dynamics to the pace at which the 
votes are reported on election night, creating a horse-race feel in the few 
hours right after the polls close, the ups and downs of the candidates as 
the votes come in are typically explained in terms of well-known 
political geography—Democratic big cities reporting, downstate 
Republican counties reporting, etc. The explanation for why the post-
election-night count skews toward one party or the other requires 
reference to more abstract facts, such as the composition of the 
provisional ballot and mail ballot pools. And, once those votes skew to 
one party or the other, it encourages supporters of the party on the 
disadvantaged side to wonder why provisional and mail voters did not 
vote the way they were “supposed” to on Election Day, or did not follow 
the rules they were supported to follow. 
 
V. Assessing Vulnerabilities in Reporting Election Results 
 
The previous sections sketch out the processes that result in information 
about election returns being communicated to the public. Where are the 
vulnerabilities to be found? 
 
We can identify two general classes of vulnerabilities with the election-
reporting system itself, which we term static and dynamic. Static 
vulnerabilities are those that pertain to static features of the vote-
reporting system. These might include vulnerabilities to Internet-
connected components of the ENR reporting system, such as the ones 
that led to the malicious attacks in Ukraine. Or they might include 
mundane problems of information transmission, such as mishearing a 
vote total over a phone line or mistyping a number into a computer. 
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Dynamic vulnerabilities are those that occur because the information 
about election returns is not revealed instantaneously, but across a 
period of time. First, information is revealed across time, and is not 
revealed randomly with respect to time. It may first be revealed from 
Democratic-leaning counties right after the polls close and then from 
Republican-leaning counties later in the evening. Or, Republican-
leaning Election-Day ballots may be counted on Election Day and 
Democratic-leaning mail ballots may be counted in the following days. 
Second, every state of the data at any general time can be compared to 
the state of the data at different times, inviting attentive observers to 
draw inferences from changes themselves, even when they are not 
biased with respect to parties or candidates. 
 
Attacking static vulnerabilities has been part and parcel of election 
administration from its inception and have been integrated into 
administrative practice. The very fact that election results may be 
incorrectly reported from a polling place, for example, motivates 
canvassing practices aimed at uncovering and correcting errors. Among 
these canvassing practices are careful accounting for all ballots used at 
a polling place, with the total number of votes reported to the local 
election office. These practices also include comparing results of the 
current election with past elections. Finally, the movement to increase 
the sophistication of post-election tabulation audits, such as risk-
limiting audits, is motivated by a desire to identify a host of static errors 
that appear in the tabulation and reporting processes, and to correct them 
if the outcome of the election seems at stake. 
 
Based on our direct knowledge of the vote-reporting system and 
interviews with election officials, we know that there is general 
awareness of information-technology-related vulnerabilities within the 
vote-reporting system. It is for that reason that official reports of vote 
totals generally are transmitted physically from place-to-place, and 
pains are taken to ensure that official data are not transmitted via the 
Internet. Memory cards and tally sheets are carried by hand from polling 
places to the local election office. Certified local-jurisdiction results are 
sent to the state capital by courier. A second copy of results may be 
transmitted electronically, to give officials at the receiving end a “heads 
up” about what to expect when the official reports are received, and to 
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serve as an independent source of information against which to compare 
the official results when they arrive. 
 
The unofficial results are most often transmitted electronically, and are 
where the vulnerabilities may be greatest. Vote tallies may be uploaded 
via wireless modem from a polling place to the local election office.54 
A spreadsheet containing election return totals may be e-mailed from a 
local election office to the state. A jurisdiction’s computer system can 
be subject to a DDOS attack, making the transmission of this 
information impossible to accomplish.  
 
Although it can rightfully be said that interference with unofficial tally 
reports does not change official results, it is also the case that the public 
is paying the most attention to the informal information in the time 
immediately after an election. For that reason, breaches of ENR systems 
can be very dangerous to public confidence and legitimacy, even if they 
have no effect at all on the official vote count. 
 
Dynamic vulnerabilities exist even in the perfect world in which all the 
static vulnerabilities have been solved. The narrative in this paper 
identifies four specific forms of dynamic vulnerability that seem 
particularly important. The first is the “natural” evolution of election 
results, either on election night or during the overtime period. The lead 
in the electoral horse race is likely to change in the course of an evening, 
dramatically at first, less-so over time. Furthermore, different pieces of 
election information may be reported on different time scales, 
suggesting that officials are manipulating the returns, even though they 
are not.  
 
An example of this occurred on election night in 2004 in Ohio, when 
Cuyahoga County began reporting both precinct-level tabulation totals 
 
54 The use of wireless models to transmit election returns remains one of the sorest 
points of disagreement between election technology activists, on the one hand, and 
election officials and vendors, on the other. See Kevin Monahan, Cynthia McFadden 
& Didi Martinez, Online and Vulnerable: Experts Find Nearly Three Dozen U.S. 
Voting Systems Connected to Internet, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2020, 6:36 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/online-vulnerable-experts-find-nearly-
three-dozen-u-s-voting-n1112436[https://perma.cc/8L6G-EWXC]. 
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for candidates and estimated turnout.55 For much of the evening, the 
number of votes reflected in the tabulation totals for candidates vastly 
exceeded the turnout levels reported for the precincts, which led some 
to charges of “ghost voters” in the county.56 This discrepancy was easily 
explained by the fact that the accumulation of vote tabulations occurred 
separately from turnout reports—the same precincts were not 
necessarily reflected in the two reports, and in any case, vote tabulations 
were being reported faster than turnout tabulations. Regardless of the 
benign explanation, for several hours on election night, close observers 
of Ohio election returns spent considerable time and energy chasing 
down the charge that election officials were stuffing the ballot boxes in 
that county. 
 
Related to the dynamic nature of election-tabulation reporting is the 
second factor, which is the presence and correction of errors. Large, 
sudden changes to election margins are likely to draw attention. As 
much as we would like to think that large, sudden changes that return 
the time-path of the election results back to the previous equilibrium in 
correction of an error would be reassuring, the correction itself probably 
draws attention to the error in the first place. Is the correction just a 
correction, or is it evidence of a struggle over the information to be 
conveyed to the public? 
 
The third dynamic vulnerability is the blue shift as identified above. 
Although we have no evidence that the blue shift is due to the 
manipulation of election results during the overtime period, its 
persistent size and increasing tilt toward one party invites questions 
about whether votes are being manufactured by partisan election 
officials.  
 
The fourth vulnerability comes in considering the role of the exit polls. 
Currently, exit polls are rarely used by national news organizations to 
call the winner of a race on election night, except in cases where the exit 
 
55 Jake Tapper & Avery Miller, Conspiracy Theory Abound After Bush Victory, ABC 
NEWS (Nov. 9, 2004, 11:18 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=239735 
[https://perma.cc/KL22-4FQR]. 
56 Id. 
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poll data and prior expectations suggest that the vote spread between the 
top-two candidates will be overwhelmingly large. In the past, leaked 
midday results have muddied the waters about the accuracy of the final 
results, such as in 2004 when three media outlets published exit poll 
results during the day,57 not to mention the controversy that arose later 
on when methodological problems caused the final results to be strongly 
biased in a pro-Democratic direction.58 
 
The vulnerabilities identified here increase the likelihood for voters to 
be confused or misled by information about election results. The 
possibility for simple confusion starts with the fact that the public is 
largely unaware of the dynamic nature of election-results reporting 
outlined here. That ignorance is reinforced with little apparent 
knowledge of these dynamics among reporters covering election 
night.59 This lack of knowledge is further reinforced by attitudes among 
candidates that election results should be released instantly, without any 
mistakes, and that any deviation from these expectations should be 
treated with suspicion. If the dynamics are covered at all, the starting 
point is to uncover why things are “fishy,” with the most vocal voices 
inclined to ratchet-up the rhetoric. 
 
The previous paragraph can, in some ways, be considered the best-case 
scenario. For starters, a significant minority of voters are predisposed to 
believe that election fraud caused by manipulating vote totals is 
common. In the MIT module of the 2018 Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study (CCES), for instance, 6.4% of respondents stated that 
they believed that stealing or tampering with votes in local elections was 
“very common;” another 21.3% stated it “occurs occasionally.” With 
 
57 Robert Niles, Exit Polls Bring Traffic Deluge, Scrutiny to Blogs, Slate, ONLINE 
JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 18, 2004), https://www.ojr.org/041105glaser/ 
[https://perma.cc/34YU-DX62]. 
58 See MICHAEL W. TRAUGOTT, The Accuracy of the National Preelection Polls in 
the 2004 Presidential Election, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 642, 643 (2005).  
59 It should be remembered by most reporters covering election results on election 
night, especially for non-national outlets, who do not normally cover elections as 
their beat. Even for those who cover elections on a regular basis, election 
administration is a corner of elections that is rarely covered; election night itself is a 
small slice of the overall coverage about which few reporters develop expertise. 
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reference to state elections, these percentages were 7.8% and 21.0%, 
respectively.60 These attitudes are affected by partisanship. For the 
“state” version of the stealing or tampering question, for instance, 
21.2% of Democrats said it was either “very common” or “occurs 
occasionally,” compared to 39.6% of Republicans.61 Furthermore, 
although no research has been conducted into how the reporting of 
election results affects attitudes toward fraud, we do know that there is 
a strong “losers effect” in voter confidence—supporters of losing 
candidates for president become less confident that their vote was 
counted as cast once the outcome of the election is known.62 
 
Thus, not only do voters lack knowledge about how the vote-count 
system works, nor are they likely to be enlightened through news 
coverage, large numbers of voters are predisposed to be skeptical of 
reports of vote counts; news detrimental to one’s favored candidate 
reinforces that predisposition. This means that raising doubts about vote 
counts as they are proceeding is ripe for manipulation in the hours and 
days following the election. 
 
The technology of reporting vote counts is vulnerable to malicious 
attacks and errors, as are other computerized parts of the voting system. 
State and local election administrators have taken administrative actions 
and spent millions of dollars over the past four years to improve the 
resiliency of the technological component of the vote-counting system.  
 
60 Analysis conducted by the authors. These questions were asked in the pre-election 
wave of the survey, so were not yet contaminated by reference to a “sore loser” 
effect. Raw datasets to reproduce this analysis are available on the CCES Dataverse. 
See Charles Stewart, Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016 Team Module 
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), HARV. DATAVERSE (2016), 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TIMWT4.  
61 Furthermore, regression analysis reveals that Democrats were much more likely to 
believe that vote tampering or stealing was common in highly Republican states, 
whereas attitudes of Independents and Republicans were unrelated to the 
partisanship of the state. (Partisanship in this case is measured by the percentage of 
the two-party received by Clinton in 2016. Regression results are available from the 
authors upon request.) 
62 Michael W. Sances & Charles Stewart III, Partisanship and Confidence in the 
Vote Count: Evidence from US national elections since 2000, 40 ELECTORAL STUD. 
176, 183 (2015). 




Because it must at some point come in contact with the Internet, 
election-night reporting presents the widest threat surface for election 
administrators. And yet, the technical vulnerabilities may not be the 
most consequential. The temporal dynamics of election returns, both on 
election night itself and in the days following, present opportunities for 
malicious actors—hackers and propagandists—to manipulate voters’ 
understanding of those dynamics in destructive ways. Although we 
cannot put a firm number on it, it is our sense that this latter set of 
vulnerabilities, which surround the communication of election returns, 
is a greater source of danger for the functioning and legitimacy of the 
American system of election administration.   
 
VI. What Is to Be Done? Protecting against Vulnerabilities 
 
The cybersecurity framework developed by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology to help organizations improve cybersecurity 
practices in order to manage security risks identifies five “concurrent 
and continuous” functions:63 
 
1. Identify risks by developing “an organizational 
understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, 
people, assets, data, and capabilities.”64 
2. Protect assets by developing and implementing “appropriate 
safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services.”65 
3. Detect anomalies by developing and implementing 
“appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a 
cybersecurity event.”66 
4. Respond to detected incidents.67 
 
63 U.S. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 3 (vers. 1.1). 
64 Id. at 7. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 8. 
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5. Recover from incidents through plans that provide for 
“resilience and . . . restore any capabilities or services that 
were impaired due to a cybersecurity incident.”68 
 





Most of this paper has been aimed at identifying the vulnerabilities that 
lie in the domain of election-result reporting. Those vulnerabilities 
reside both within the narrow domain of election administration, in the 
administrative units responsible for conducting the election and 
reporting the results, and outside of election administration, in the 
network of institutions and individuals who report election results to the 
public. Within election administration, the primary challenges are static 
vulnerabilities that affect whether information will be recorded and 
transmitted accurately, and whether malicious actors can influence the 
flow of information within the formal system and between the formal 
system and the greater society.  
 
The practice of election administration has focused on identifying and 
remediating vulnerabilities in the tabulation-reporting function for over 
a century. Decision-makers and policymakers have been slow to 
recognize the vulnerabilities that lie in the use of information 
technologies, and the degree to which they constitute threats to be 
managed. (The history of the use of automation technologies in election 
administration has emphasized its role in reducing clerical errors and 
increasing speed; it has taken a long time to recognize the attendant 
costs and to weigh benefits against those costs.) At the same time, it 
must be acknowledged that computer professionals and election 
officials often profoundly disagree over how much risk is created by the 
reliance on information technologies to manage information flow in 
election administration. This is especially true as we move away from 
obvious “computer systems,” such as outward-facing servers and other 
 
68 Id. 
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equipment connected to the Internet, and approach dedicated voting 
equipment that has computerized components. 
  
Less attention has been paid into identifying vulnerabilities related to 
the interface between election administration and the public. There is no 
doubt that there are technological vulnerabilities among the news 
organizations’ computer systems that exist independent of reporting on 
elections.69 More fundamentally, though, the vulnerabilities that exist in 
this area are probably not technical—that is, related to static problems—
and more likely to be social. These vulnerabilities include lack of 
knowledge about the vote-reporting system by news-gatherers and the 
general public, plus the partisan lens through which the public perceive 
news about politics, including election returns. 
  
Our own sense is that although it may be theoretically possible to 
maliciously manipulate election results on election night or in overtime, 
it is very unlikely. As with most things in American election 
administration, our assessment on this point starts with the distributed 
nature of what is being administered. Certainly, with over 100,000 
precincts in the United States, averaging approximately 2,000 per state, 
launching a malicious attack against the returns at the source seems 
especially unlikely. The likelihood that a malicious attack against 
central-count tabulation systems would be successful may be higher, but 
the greater inherent vulnerability of these systems is already dealt with 
through imposing significantly higher barriers barring physical access 
to these systems than exist in accessing systems that tabulate votes in 
precincts and early-vote centers. Using remote electronic means to 
 
69 One sign that news organizations are part of the ecosystem of election reporting, 
and that their potential computer vulnerabilities are a matter of concern, is that the 
Associated Press’s elections reporting unit is a member of the Sector Coordinating 
Council for the Election Infrastructure Subsector. See Press Release, Dep't of 
Homeland Sec., Readout of DHS Meetings with State Election Officials and Other 
Election Sector Partners (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/02/19/readout-dhs-meetings-state-election-officials-
and-other-election-sector-partners [https://perma.cc/8YQK-TQEQ]. 
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launch a wholesale attack against the official returns at the source seems 
virtually impossible, regardless of the source.70  
  
Of course, the vulnerabilities are greater with the unofficial reporting 
pipeline, since information sometimes goes through unsecured 
channels. In addition, although there are hundreds of precincts in the 
average local election jurisdiction, there is only one election office. It 
may be hard to hack the distributed system, but the single point at which 
reports from polling places are directed may be a more inviting target 




The “easy” protection solutions—at least to articulate—are those that 
impose controls over access to the systems that tabulate, record, and 
disseminate information about vote totals. The core list of protections is 
relatively short and well-known—strong passwords, multi-factor 
authentication, firewalls, and air-gaps. Other protections are social, such 
as having in place systems that provide for independent verification of 
results before they are released into the wild. 
 Although there are clearly limits to the utility of public education, it is 
also clear that education plays an important role in protecting against 
the vulnerabilities of confusion, misinformation, and disinformation. 
This education starts with those in the media who cover and report 
election results. 
  
Related to education are the strategies that the media employ to inform 
the public about the status of election results at any given time. Attention 
needs to be paid by the media, first, to how the number of outstanding 
ballots is reported. Because of the growth of non-traditional modes of 
voting, such as early in-person or mail-in ballots, the practice of 
reporting the percentage of precincts reporting needs to be rethought, by 
both election officials and the media. What should replace it, on the 
 
70 Of course, fraud has been perpetuated against hand-written election-return records. 
Nothing we write here is intended to diminish the possibilities of old-fashioned 
election fraud in any given election. Our point on the matter, however, is that the 
protections against election tabulation fraud at the source have been designed to 
combat these older methods of stealing votes. 
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other hand, is unclear. Expressing the status of the vote count in terms 
of percentage of ballots cast is conceptually superior to the old precinct-
percentage measures, but is also fraught with opportunities for 
misunderstanding and disinformation. What happens, for instance, 
when the forecast of ballots to be counted produces an under-estimate, 
resulting in reports that more than 100% of ballots have been counted, 
with more to come? Or when the forecast of total ballots is adjusted 
upward, causing the percent of votes counted to drop? 
   
In 2016, the New York Times introduced the “needle” to reflect its 
prediction of who would win the presidency, and particular states.71 One 
feature of the needle, that it fluctuated in proportion to the uncertainty 
of the forecast, is close to what we have in mind as one implementation 
of this idea. The Times election-night forecasting page had other 
graphical representations of the uncertainty of their results, which were 
primarily a function of the number of outstanding ballots in proportion 
to the estimated margin.72 
   
The most direct ways to provide information that guards against 
premature finality probably require two major activities on behalf of 
election officials. First, election officials should make every effort to 
accurately report the number of outstanding ballots left to count late on 
election night, along with a characterization about where the 
outstanding ballots are likely to come from. For many local 
jurisdictions, this will add work on a very hectic election night, but 
providing this information will help to start communicating with voters 
the contingent nature of the results that are being reported. 
   
Second, states should consider adopting Virginia’s change-log process, 
to account for changes to election results after election night. Again, this 
 
71 Nate Cohn, Josh Katz & Kevin Quealy, What is the Election Needle?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/03/upshot/needle-iowa-caucuses-
faq.html [https://perma.cc/336N-PCBV].  
72 Live Presidential Forecast, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/forecast/president [https://perma.cc/6D58-
B2VM]. Of course, the idea of forecasting the results through a graphical interface 
that appears “scientific” may also have the negative consequence of suggesting a 
false sense of precision. 
2020] STEWART III & PETTIGREW 632 
 
 
would create additional work for local and state election offices, but it 
would provide the benefit of proactively managing information about 
the change in the vote returns after Election Day. 
   
To argue against these proposals, it is possible to argue that to some 
degree, less transparency is called for. (At least the idea should be 
entertained for further discussion.) By “less transparency,” we mean 
less attention paid by local and state election offices to reporting 
unofficial election returns via online ENR systems. This would not shut 
out the public altogether, since the Associated Press and Edison, would 
still be in the business of gathering election returns themselves and 
reporting them unofficially. But, this reporting would now be clearly 
unofficial, providing the public perhaps less reason to regard 
preliminary figures as definitive. 
   
Finally, a discussion needs to be started about “calling” the outcome of 
elections before all the ballots have been counted. On the one hand, it is 
possible that the announcement by media organizations that a candidate 
is the “likely winner” of a state is heard by viewers as a factual 
statement, not a forecast.73 On the other hand, the networks do refer to 
the candidate as the “projected winner.” The problem may not be the 
practice of “calling” states for candidates, as much as it is in 
communicating that a “call” is contingent on assumptions about the 
accuracy of the data that the state provided, which could change during 
the official canvass. 
   
Discouraging networks from identifying candidates as projected 
winners would accomplish little to reduce the risks associated with 
election-result reporting. News organizations are unlikely to all agree to 
restrictions and, in any case, the projections are news that should be 
 
73 In the postmortems following the 2000 presidential election, news executives 
engaged in soul-searching over the consequences of prematurely declaring a likely 
winner and the cascade of events that followed as a consequence. See Peter Marks & 
Bill Carter, Media Rethink an Urge to Say Who’s First, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at 
B1. We know of no political science research that studies how attitudes are changed 
when news organizations declare a candidate the “projected winner” of a state. 
Having research directly on the topic would help to clarify whether declaring 
candidates projected winners is actually a problem worth addressing. 
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reported. News organizations should be encouraged, on the other hand, 
to provide the evidence to the public that has led to the projection at the 
time the projection is made, and to specify the circumstances that could 




Detecting cyber-intrusions into computer systems used in election 
administration has been one of the chief topics of election security over 
the past four years, and we have nothing of substance to add to those 
discussions, especially to the degree that detection is premised on 
monitoring the nature of the information packets directed to that system 
via networks, or to the behavior of the computers being used.74 
Considerable attention has also been paid to detecting efforts at pursuing 
information operations strategies in elections. Nor does this paper have 
anything directly to add to that discussion.  
   
However, our analysis here does suggest some conclusions about 
detecting successful intrusions into the system of reporting election 
results. The methods the national news organizations use to judge the 
quality of the election data flowing into their decision desks provides an 
important bulwark against compromising that data, and would likely 
catch successful attempts to manipulate results that would have a 
material effect on the election outcome.  
   
The nature of this protection is illustrated above in the time series that 
recorded election-night election-return dynamics from Wisconsin and 
Florida. As these two sets of graphs suggest, election-return information 
flows into the national news operations in streams that follow historical 
patterns that are distinct for each state. While we have not explored the 
issue directly, we suspect that these historical patterns pertain to local 
jurisdictions, as well.  
 
 
74 The Center for Internet Security hosts a suite of resources that address technical 
approaches to election cybersecurity. Election Security Best Practices, CTR FOR 
INTERNET SEC., https://www.cisecurity.org/elections-resources/ 
[https://perma.cc/7RUK-ANJL]. 
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 The wholesale malicious manipulation of reported vote totals would 
have to follow these patterns quite closely, or else be flagged for 
investigation. Keep in mind, as well, that vote-total data now originate 
through two independent news-gathering channels and are fed 
simultaneously to a half-dozen national media operations. Through 
2016, all major television and print media outlets used the vote-count 
data from the Associated Press. In 2017 and 2018, ABC, CBS, CNN, 
and NBC received their vote-count data from Edison Research, while 
Fox News, the New York Times, Washington Post, and other 
(traditional) print media received their data from the Associated Press. 
 These independent vote-count operations allow for both real-time and 
post-election auditing of informal vote reports. For a variety of reasons, 
the Associated Press and Edison operations are unlikely to be perfectly 
in sync with each other at points in the night. But, if they do report 
results that are meaningfully and dramatically different from each other, 
it would get noticed quickly. 
   
In the moment on election night, anomalies would certainly be noticed 
by the news operations receiving the data. Each operation supplying the 
data, the Associated Press and Edison, feeds that data to multiple 
downstream media outlets. Anomalies are noticed. Many of the separate 
news operations maintain open communication channels with each 
other on election night, and share information about election returns that 
seem amiss. 
 
Finally, an attack on the election returns themselves would have to be 
sustained throughout election night and into the overtime period. A 
single successful penetration of the informal reporting infrastructure 
might be successful in causing a momentary discontinuity in the vote 
counts, but this would be quickly caught by the automated and manual 
quality-control processes that are in place. Such an attack would have 
to be sustained throughout a state in small amounts that would 
accumulate into a deviation from the actual returns in such a way that 
fit within historical norms. In other words, a successful, sustained attack 
that dramatically altered the results in a single county would cause that 
county’s vote results to anomalously stand out when compared to the 
other counties in the state. In order to mask this, a malicious actor would 
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have to sustain successful attacks in numerous jurisdictions throughout 
the state. 
   
These comments pertain to the informal information-reporting process 
that is centered on news organizations. The formal process tends to have 
procedures in place to detect attempts to manipulate the results. While 
these procedures may be circumvented in low-profile races on occasion, 
it is hard to imagine them being circumvented for high-profile races, 
like the presidency. One basis for detecting the manipulation of official 
returns is having multiple sources of information about the election 
returns. Parts of the canvassing process, especially those that resemble 
double-entry bookkeeping, require that the same calculation results be 
produced through independent means.  
   
The primary way that the accuracy of election returns in the formal 
process is ensured by transmitting them through multiple means. The 
best protection against manipulation through an attack on computer 
networks is to communicate those returns physically, on paper and by 
currier. If there is at least one physical channel to communicate election 
returns to the next level of aggregation, then that report could serve as a 
check against the information that was communicated via an electronic 
network, either the Internet or the telephone network. Any difference 
between the two forms of communication would have to be investigated 
back to the source. We have not done a systematic survey of state and 
local election officials, but based on our discussions with many election 
officials, we believe that most states rely on communicating formal 




We assume that in the 2020 election, as in every election, some anomaly 
in the vote-count will emerge in some jurisdiction. Such an anomaly 
will require the responsible officials to respond by reconstructing what 
the true election count is, and by demonstrating to the public that the 
correct results have been included in the official tally. 
  
Although anomalies in both the informal and formal vote tallies will 
probably create doubt among the public in whether the vote count is 
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correct, and officials need plans to respond to both, in the end, the most 
important vulnerabilities to respond to are those that infect the official 
vote process. The manipulation of official vote tallies has the potential 
to install the wrong person into office. For that reason, it is important 
that among the responses to anomalies that are available to election 
officials is the ability to overturn the presumed results of an election, in 
light of evidence that the original count was fraudulent or based on a 
counting error. 
   
If the manipulation or error is discovered during the canvassing period, 
or even the period in which challenges to election returns are possible, 
all is not lost. However, many states, if not most, time their post-
election-audit processes to occur after the results have been certified, 
and make no explicit provision for revisiting the results of the election 
if a serious, material anomaly is discovered. These types of post-election 
auditing procedures are flawed. 
   
The new kid on the block with respect to post-election auditing is risk-
limiting audits (RLAs). RLAs are designed to be implemented before 
the certification of the results, and to inform election officials whether 
they should be confident in the results—or if they should bump the audit 
up to a full recount.75 RLAs conducted as part of the certification 
process currently provide the best mechanism through which the 
manipulation of election returns at the precinct level can be detected 
and, most importantly, remedied. State legislatures should not only 





Recovery in the cybersecurity context is related to learning from the 
intrusion and restoring the system to a functioning level, presumably 
with new safeguards in place to overcome prior security deficiencies. 
The United States has not yet experienced a serious large-scale attack 
 
75 See generally Knowing Its Right: A Two-Party Guide to Risk-Limiting Audits., 
DEMOCRACY FUND (May 22, 2020), https://democracyfund.org/idea/knowing-its-
right-limiting-the-risk-of-certifying-elections/ [https://perma.cc/XL9U-8FK6]. 
2020] STEWART III & PETTIGREW 637 
 
 
on the system that reports election results, either formally or informally, 
so it is difficult to speculate with any certainty about the ability of the 
system to learn from intrusions in such a way that makes the system 
more secure. 
  
The United States does have experience with situations that are adjacent 
to the vote-reporting system, and we might learn from the responses to 
those experiences. Among these are the controversy over Jimmy 
Carter’s early concession on election night 1980, based on preliminary 
election results, and news organizations reporting election results before 
the polls are closed statewide in states that straddle time zones.  As a 
result of the controversy surrounding Carter’s concession, national 
media organizations agreed that they would not “call” any state until all 
precincts had closed there.76 Efforts, already noted, by the New York 
Times to visualize the uncertainty of preliminary election results 
through the “needle,” is another example of the system learning and 
trying to adapt. 
   
The negative side of the ledger has entries, too. The nation’s slow and 
uncoordinated response to the known cyberattacks on election 
infrastructure in 2016 should give one pause in considering whether and 
how the nation would respond to a malicious attack on the vote-
reporting system. However, any attack against the formal vote-reporting 
system would be an attack against state and local systems, not a system 
run by the federal government. This gives us optimism that the response 
to a cyber-attack against the vote-reporting infrastructure would be led 
by the response of local election officials, and other state and local 
actors, and would not be as slow to respond as the most recent federal 






76 Reginald Stuart, Congress to Debate a Uniform Schedule for National Voting, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1985, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/18/us/congress-
to-debate-a-uniform-schedule-for-national-voting.html [https://perma.cc/8CK6-
75LQ]. 





The election-reporting infrastructure in the United States is distributed 
between formal and informal actors, and knits together a highly 
decentralized set of players. Like all aspects of election administration, 
the decentralization of the system creates both advantages and 
disadvantages in the struggle against error and actors with malicious 
intent. Unlike most other areas of election administration, the reporting 
of election results occurs through formal and informal challenges. The 
two challenges both reinforce each other and provide an opportunity to 
audit, in real time, the information flowing through the system. 
  
In every challenge to the system of election administration since 2000, 
there has been a tendency to try and identify a technological magic 
bullet to solve the problem identified, whether it be voting machines or 
voter registration. In the case of reporting election results, there is likely 
to be no technological silver bullet. Technology itself opens up 
vulnerabilities. But, even if we leave technological vulnerabilities aside, 
election returns by their nature are subject to manipulation when they 
are communicated to the public. In thinking about how to ride out the 
cybersecurity storm of 2020, it is important to consider both the 
technological and social aspects of how election returns are 
communicated to the public if the country is to protect against efforts to 
undermine the legitimacy of the election. 
 
